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A.

INTRODUCTION

Background and Terms of the Agreement

After weeks of intensive negotiating,1 at 3:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), January 19, 1981, the government of Algeria
announced that the United States and Iran had signed 2 the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Re1. The best account of the negotiations prior to the Majlis November 2, 1980
establishment of four conditions for the hostages' release is the ABC News Special "America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations" aired on January 28,

1981. A synopsis of the negotiations by Deputy Secretary of State Warren M.
Christopher and others after that date is found in N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at
A2, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
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public of Algeria,3 thereby paving the way for the release of the
fifty-two United States diplomats and nationals held in Iran for
444 days.4 The next day, January 20, 1981, as Ronald Reagan
concluded his inaugural address 5 at 12:25 p.m. EST, the fifty-two
hostages boarded an Algerian jet.
The hostage settlement agreement consists of two accords, one
freeing the hostages in return for the unblocking and transfer, via
an escrow agent, to Iran of Iranian assets (Declaration).7 The
other accord established an International Arbitral Tribunal to
settle claims of Iran, the United States and each country's nationals against the other and its nationals (Claims Settlement Declaration) . The avowed principles of the Declaration are to restore
Iran to the financial position it enjoyed prior to the freezing of
the assets, and to terminate all suits between the two parties and
their nationals.9 Under the Declaration, the United States promised not to intervene "directly or indirectly, politically or militarily in Iran's internal affairs." 10 Pursuant to the agreement in the
Declaration to establish an escrow account at a "mutually agreeable central bank,"' 1 the Bank of England was chosen as escrow
agent.12 The United States promised to transfer to the Bank of
England all gold bullion and assets owned by Iran which were

3. The full text of the Declaration [hereinafter referred to as the hostage
settlement agreement] is found in N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A4, col. 1, and
reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 224 (1981). The executive orders implementing the agreement are found in 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 3027 (Jan.
19, 1981).
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 1.

5. Id. at col. 6.
6. The Iranian assets had been frozen since November 14, 1979. Declaration
of the Government of the Democratic and PopularRepublic of Algeria, 20 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Declaration];see notes 9-24

infra and accompanying text for the content of the Declaration.
7. Declaration,supra note 6.
8. Declarationof the Government of the Democratic and PopularRepublic
of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 230 (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Claims Settlement Declaration];see notes 25-31 infra and accompanying text for the content
of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
9. Declaration,supra note 6, at 224.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 225.
12. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
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then in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.'" The United
States is also to compel foreign branches of United States banks
to transfer to the escrow account all Iranian assets that "stood on
their books" on or after November 14, 1979.14 Upon certification
by the government of Algeria to the Algerian Central Bank that
the fifty-two hostages had "safely departed from Iran," the Algerian Central Bank was to direct the Bank 15of England immediately
to forward to it all funds held in escrow.
Different treatment was given to Iranian assets held in domestic branches of United States banks and by private parties. The
Declaration requires that within thirty days the United States
and Iran establish an "interest bearing security account" at the
Bank of England and gives the United States six months to transfer to the Bank of England all Iranian assets held in domestic
branches of United States banks."" As the funds are transmitted
to the Bank of England, the Algerian Central Bank is to direct
that one half of such funds are to be forwarded to Iran while the
other half are to be placed in the security account. Once the security account obtains a balance of one billion dollars, remaining
funds from domestic branches of United States banks are to be
transferred directly to Iran. Funds in the security account are to
be held for satisfaction of claims against Iran,' 7 as determined by
the procedures established under the Claims Settlement Declaration. Should the account balance drop below $500 million, Iran is
required to deposit'amounts sufficient to maintain the account at
the $500 million level,' 8 and the United States is obligated "to act
to bring about" the transfer to the escrow account of all other
Iranian funds or securities "located in the United States and
abroad"' 9 and to "arrange, subject to the provisions of U[nited]
S[tates] law applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties which are located in the

13. Declaration, supra note 6, at 225,

4; see Exec. Order No. 12,277, 17

WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 3029 (Jan. 19, 1981).

14. Declaration, supra note 6, at 226, 5; see Exec. Order No. 12,277, 17
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 3030 (Jan. 19, 1981).
15. Declaration,supra note 6, at 225, %3.
16. Id. at 226, %6.
17. The validity of these claims will be determined by the Claims Settlement Declaration.See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
18. Id. 7; see Exec. Order No. 12,279, 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 3031
(Jan. 19, 1981).
19. Declaration,supra note 6, at 226-27, I 8.
WEEKLY
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United States and abroad and
which are not within the scope of
'20
the preceding paragraphs.

The United States is also required to revoke trade sanctions
against Iran and to terminate all pending litigation against Iran,
including the suit against Iran in the International Court of Justice, 21 and to bar pending or future litigation arising out of the
embassy seizure, hostage taking and detention, and injury resulting from nonofficial acts during the "Islamic Revolution in
Iran. 22 Finally,23 the United States also promised to freeze any
property of the late Shah of Iran or his close relatives and to facilitate its recovery by Iran.24
The Claims Settlement Declaration agreed to by the United
States and Iran15 provides for the establishment of a nine-member International Arbitral Tribunal to be operated according to
the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 26 The tribunal has jurisdiction
over claims by nationals of both countries, including debts, contracts, 27 official acts of expropriation and "other measures affecting property rights," but not over claims nullified by the Declaration freeing the hostages, "and claims arising out of the actions of
the United States in response to the conduct described in such
paragraph and excluding claims arising under a binding contract
20. Id. at 227, 7 9; see Exec. Order No. 12,280, 12,881, 17 WEE.KLY CoMP. OF
3033-36 (Jan. 19, 1981).
21. In the Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (United States v. Iran), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 553
(1980), Iran was required to make reparation to the United States for damage
resulting from the embassy takeover and hostage seizure. Id. at 574.
22. Declaration,supra note 6, at 227, 1 10-11; see Exec. Order No. 12,283,
17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 3037 (Jan. 19, 1981). Pursuant to the Declaration, President Carter established the President's Commission on Hostage Compensation to determine whether the hostages should be financially compensated,
and if so, in what amounts. Exec. Order No. 12,285, 17 WEEKLY Cornp. OF PRES.
Doc. 3039 (Jan. 19, 1981).
23. The Declaration also establishes procedures for dispute settlement. Declaration,supra note 6, at 228, T 17.
24. Id. at 227-28, 17 12-16. The United States will also survey the late Shah's
property in the United States, request that Iran's recovery of such assets should
not be barred by the act of state or sovereign immunity doctrines, and guarantee
the enforcement of judgments against such assets. Id.
25. Claims Settlement Declaration,supra note 8, at 230.
26. Id. at 231, art. III, 1 1-2.
27. This includes "transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or
bank guarantees." Id. at 230-31, art. II, 1 1.
PRES. Doc.
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between the parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian court in response to the Majlis position."2" The tribunal also
has jurisdiction over counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as the original claim and over official claims of the United
States and Iran stemming from contracts for the purchase and
sale of goods and services. 29 All claims are to be filed within the
later of one year after the agreement's effective date or six
30
months after the appointment of the president of the tribunal.
Finally, the tribunal has sole power to determine the applicable
law, including commercial and international law, and choice of
law rules. 31
B.

Controversy Over the Validity of the Agreement

As soon as the United States began celebrating the hostages'
release, the validity of the agreement became a subject of intense
controversy. Conservative commentators urged that the United
States "renounce the deal. '32 To them, the Declaration was not
an agreement but extortion, and had "the same moral standing as
an agreement made with a kidnapper, that is to say, none at
'
all.'IM
Although praising the negotiators' hard work, these commentators questioned both the wisdom and the constitutionality
of the Declaration and argued that to fulfill its terms would be to
legitimize and encourage terrorism and the violation of international law. 4 These commentators3 5 and others" held that the actions of the Iranian student militants, subsequently endorsed by
the government of Iran, came within the purview of article 52 of

28. Id.; see text accompanying note 22 supra.
29. Claims Settlement Declaration,supra note 8, at 230-31, art. II, 51 1-2.
30. Id. at 232, art. .111, 4.
31. "The Tribfinal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international
law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant
usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances." Id. art. V.
32. Renounce the Deal, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1981, at 26, col. 1 (editorial).
33. Id.
34. "And it is important for the world to know that extortionists are not
entitled to the same legal and moral consideration as governments operating in
accordance with international law." Id.
35. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1981, at 30, col. 1.
36. Malawer, A Gross Violation of Treaty Law, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 2, 1981, at
13, col. 1.
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties3 7 which renders
void treaties "procured by duress"3 8 and constituted an attack on
the United States "diplomatic territory" thereby offending the
1974 United Nations Definition of Aggression. Acting upon similar beliefs, Senator De Concini submitted Senate Resolution 31
on January 22, 1981.40 Citing the illegal detention and mistreat-

ment of the hostages and the provisions of the agreement itself,
the Resolution stated that the agreement with Iran was a pact
with kidnappers and terrorists and thus had no "moral author-

ity. ' 41 The Resolution called upon the Senate to support the

President in any determination he might make to refuse to fulfill
any as yet unkept promises to Iran, "inasmuch as such agreements were made in order to secure the release of the fifty-two
2
Americans held in Iran in violation of international law.'4
Other commentators questioned both the legality and wisdom
of repudiating the Declaration. According to Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, international and constitutional law are less relevant
to evaluation of the agreement than "history, politics and psychology. '43 First, Lowenfeld upholds the choice of the self-executing executive agreement rather than the treaty form by questioning the efficacy of the drawn-out advise and consent proceedings
in the Senate that are an inherent part of treaty ratification. 4 4
Second, addressing the problem of the timing of the agreements-their conclusion in the waning hours of the Carter Administration-Lowenfeld sees the issue as one of state succession
in respect of treaties and, on the basis of an established rule of
international law, he determines the agreements to be binding.45
Third, Lowenfeld states that the agreement is not void because it
37.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force, Jan. 27,

1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/l1/Add. 2 [hereinafter cited as Convention on
Treaties].
38. Id. art. 52; see text accompanying notes 131-219 infra.
39. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/0631, at 142
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Definition]; Malawer, supra note 36, at 13, col. 1.
40. S. RES. 31, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CONG. REc.
S579 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1981)(unenacted). A copy of the Wall Street Journal
editorial, supra note 32, accompanies the Resolution. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lowenfeld, InternationalLaw and the Hostage Agreement, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 27, 1981, at 30, col. 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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was procured by duress, or the threat or use of force in violation
of the United Nations Charter46 and article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.47 He states that article 52 does
not cover the case of a "hostage-taking supported by a government. '48 Furthermore, he notes, the United States, aware of article 52, engaged in long negotiations with Iran and achieved "its
primary goal" of obtaining the hostages' release while also getting
Iran to pay off certain bank loans. 49 Lowenfeld concludes that
"[t]he argument about duress, while not implausible, is sufficiently doubtful that repudiation of the agreement by the
U[nited] S[tates] would . . . be ill-advised. 5 0 Finally, reviewing
the wisdom and probable success of the claims settlement agreement, Lowenfeld notes that the question whether the claimants
are better or worse off under the accord is very difficult, and depends on whether the Iranians will replenish the fund out of
which claims are to be paid, whether the claims tribunal can function effectively, and whether a claimant's prospects for recovery
were actually any better in United States courts despite the exis51
tence of sovereign immunity and act of state defenses.
Although it will take years of litigation and commentary to assess the full significance and consequences of the hostage taking
and the settlement agreement, some preliminary observations
may-be made. The Declaration poses many difficult questions of
international and constitutional law. Examples of constitutional
law questions raised include the power of the President to conclude self-executing agreements and to nullify claims of citizens
brought in United States courts. 2 In examining the agreements,
this Note will concentrate on challenges to the validity of the
agreements under international law. Thus, this analysis avoids
such constitutional issues as the President's agreement-making
power, except insofar as they relate to the possible domestic con46. Id. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
47. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37.
48. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1981, at 30, col. 3-4.
49. Id. at col. 4.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. See, e.g., Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran, 49 U.S.L.W. 2531 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1981).
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sequences of an international treaty, for under international law
an unconstitutional treaty usually subsists as an international obligation. 3 In examining the effect of duress on the international
validity of the agreement, this Note will consider concepts of coercion 54 under article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties 55 and article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 56 Although the agreement freeing the hostages is separated into Declarations, this Note will consider them as a unit for purposes of
testing their validity, because of their interrelationships 7 and
their joint origin as instruments necessary to the hostages' freedom. Finally, it will suggest the potential international and domestic5 8 significance of a finding of the validity of the Treaty.

II.

EFFECT OF COERCION ON THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Prior to 1915, treaties imposed by a victor upon a vanquished
state were universally considered to be as valid as those freely
negotiated between parties.5 Imposed treaties were an exception
to the generally recognized idea that the basis of a state's obligations under international law was consent.60 International stability, and the necessity of ending hostilities, dictated that in such

53. See, e.g., McNair, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Treaty-making
Power in R. ARNOLD, TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 6 (1933): "[I]f one party produces an instrument complete and regular on the face of it ... [t]hough in fact
constitutionally defective, the other party, if it is ignorant and reasonably ignorant of the defect, is entitled to assume that the instrument is in order and to
hold the former to the obligations of the treaty."
54. See text accompanying notes 220-60 infra.
55. See text accompanying notes 131-86 infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 187-219 infra.
57.. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 18, 28 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 334-52 infra.
59. See generally S. MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
26-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES].
60. The theory that consent was the basis of states' international obligations
has been recognized as a fiction. Malawer, A New Concept of Consent and
World Public Order: "Coerced Treaties" and The Convention on The Law of
Treaties, 4 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 nn. 1 & 2, 2 n. 4 (1970), reprinted in S.
MALAWER, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
MALAWER, COERCED TREATIES] citing J. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (H. Lauterpacht & C. Waldock eds. 1958). The victorious
state was viewed as "legislating" for its vanquished foe. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 122 (3d ed. 1971).
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cases the principle of pacta sunt servanda61 prevailed over the
rights of the vanquished state.2 Beginning in 1915,63 however, the
validity of imposed or coerced treaties was challenged by state
practice, conventional international law, and writers. By 1945,
with the adoption of the United Nations Charter, customary international law "implicitly recognized the invalidity of treaties
imposed by 'aggressive' military force.""
Article 526 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 5
"explicitly"
accepts the prohibitions against coerced treaties
based upon the Charter's prohibition against the threat or use of
force, 7 and provides that "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations."68 Although article 52 rendered the hostage settlement agreement void, article 52 may not represent the correct
state of the law between the United States and Iran. First, since
the Convention, and especially the prohibition against the use of
force,6 9 are a product of the International Law Commission's efforts to "codify and progressively develop" international law via
multilateral treaty,7 0 it may not accurately reflect the state of cus-

61. E.g., article 26 of the Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, provides
that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per4
formed by them in good faith."
62.

See MALAWER, IMPOSED

TREATIES,

supra note 59, at 11-19.

63. The first such challenge was the United States response to Japan's 21
Demands upon China, in 1915. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id. at 155-56.
65. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37.
66.

MALAWER, IMPOSED

TREATIES,

supra note 59, at 156.

67. See note 46 supra.
68. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37.
69. See text accompanying notes 131-34 infra.
70. The International Law Commission is charged by the General Assembly
with the responsibility of both codifying and progressively developing international law. U.N. CHARTER, art. 13(1)(a). According to the late Professor Richard
R. Baxter "[tihe multilateral [codification] treaty is, it cannot be emphasized
too heavily, a reflection of the State practice of the parties to it and constitutes
an expression of their attitude toward customary international law, to be
weighed together with all other consistent and inconsistent evidence of customary international law." Baxter, Treaties and Custom, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 129 Recueil des Cours 52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Baxter, Treaties
and Custom]. To the extent that a multilateral treaty purportedly declaratory of
customary international law actually progressively develops the law, it ceases to
reflect state practice, for "[p]ut bluntly, progressive development means
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tomary international law, especially as it regards the scope of the
prohibition against the use of force.7 1 Second, although the
United States and Iran have signed the Convention, which has
entered into force, neither state has ratified it. 72 Third, since the

adoption of article 52 the United Nations has promulgated the
1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States73 and the 1974
Definition of Aggression,7 4 which clarify the principles upon
which article 52 is based.75 Thus, evaluation of the validity of the
Declaration requires a delineation of the alleged threat or use of
force itself, an inquiry into the applicable rules of international
law, and an examination of the scope of the rule against coerced
treaties and related doctrines.
A. Iran's Alleged Use of Force-The Backdrop for, and the
Seizure of, the Embassy in Tehran and Subsequent Events
Although the situation surrounding the embassy was tense following an attack upon and seizure of the embassy on February 14,
1979,0 tension increased dramatically after October 22, 1979,

when the former Shah of Iran was admitted to the United States
change." Id. at 39.
71. The Preamble to the Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, states that
both "codification and progressive development of the law [was] achieved in the
present Convention."
72. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary General Performs Depository Functions, List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as
of 31 Dec. 1979, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/13 at 597-98 (1980).
"If a State does not become a party to a codification treaty in the strict sense,
its conduct means one less vote in favor of the norms of the treaty as rules of
customary international law." Baxter, Treaties and Custom, supra note 70, at
52.
73. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971).
74. Definition, supra note 39, at 142-43.
75. See text accompanying notes 221-24 infra.
76. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at F1, col. 1; Feb. 4, 1981, at A9, col. 1; Case
Coiicerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (judgment)
(United States v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. -, reprintedin 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS
553, 557,
14-15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. Iran Judgment]. Two of the
best synopses of events surrounding the hostage taking and their imprisonment
are found in Days of Captivity: The Hostages' Story, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1981,
at A9-A15 [hereinafter cited as Days of Captivity], and the above cited I.C.J.
Iran Judgment.

Fall 19811

IRANIAN HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT

for cancer treatment at the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical
Center.77 Recognizing that the admission of the Shah might endanger the embassy, United States officials in Tehran on three
separate occasions requested of and received from high Iranian
government officials assurances that the embassy would be adequately protected.7 8 On November 1, 1979 a large group of Iranian demonstrators gathered outside the embassy, but the Tehran chief of police personally visited the embassy and reassured
L. Bruce Langen, the charge d'affaires and the highest ranking
diplomat at the embassy, that the embassy's security was being
taken "very seriously.

'7 9

Both local police and Revolutionary

Guards maintained their position around the compound, and Iranian citizens were- discouraged from going to the embassy to
protest.80
By November 4, 1979 the situation had changed drastically.
Since the Shah's admission to the United States on October 27,
the Ayatollah Khomeini had stepped up his verbal attacks on the
United States81 and on November 1, 1979 stated
that it was "up to the dear pupils, students, and theological students to expand with all their might their attacks against the
United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to
return the deposed and criminal shah, and to condemn this great
up dissension between the main
plot" (that is, a plot to stir
2
streams of Islamic thought).8

Apparently on their own initiative, though inspired by the
Ayatollah's statements, a group of militants calling themselves
"Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy" 83 took over the
embassy on November 4, 1979. The demonstrators, armed primarily with "sticks, baseball bats, lead pipe clubs and, by some accounts, a few pistols, rushed into the compound" by breaching
84
the steel gates and pouring over the top of the secondary walls.
77. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
78. Id. These assurances were received from Dr. Bazargan, Iran's Prime Minister, Dr. Yazdi, the Foreign Minister, and the Commander of the Iranian National Police, on October 21, 22, and 31, 1979, respectively. I.C.J. Iran Judgment,
supra note 76, at 557, 15.
79. I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 557-58, 16.
80. Id.
56-68.
81. Id. at 566-68,
82. Id. at 566-667, 59.
83. Id. at 558 1 7.
84. Days of Captivity, supra note 76, at A9, col. 4. The I.C.J. Iran Judgment,
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Iranian security guards either offered no resistance to the militants or left the scene entirely, and repeated calls to the Iranian
Foreign Ministry for help during the assault were to no avail. 5
A few embassy personnel were trapped in various buildings inside the compound, but most were able to retreat to the chancery,
where Marine guards bolted shut the heavy doors.86 Once inside,
embassy personnel began to destroy documents and call Washington and Iranian government officials.8 7 The siege of the embassy
lasted for approximately five hours, from 10:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
During this period Marine guards fired tear gas grenades at the
students several times, and when the Iranians finally broke into
the basement of the chancery and embassy personnel were forced
to retreat to higher floors, guards had to hold off the attackers at
gunpoint.88 Several times during the siege the militants held captured embassy personnel at gunpoint and knifepoint and paraded
them in front of other not yet captured Americans, to force the
latter to surrender.8 " After the last holdouts in the security vault
had shredded most sensitive documents and surrendered, the
militants beat them and threatened to mutilate them if they did
not open locked safes.90
After the embassy's surrender and intermittently during the
hostages' imprisonment, they were subjected to "acts of barbarism,"'9 1 including interrogations, physical abuse and beating,

Russian roulette sessions, and mock firing squads.9 2 Several hostages were kept in solitary confinement for most of their fourteen
supra note 76, at 558, 17, describes the militants as "a strong armed group of
several hundred people." (Emphasis added.) At approximately 10:30 a.m. on
November 7, 1979, about 500 Iranian students broke away from a group of
thousands, who were marching on the first anniversary of the shooting of Tehran University students by the Shah's police, and stormed the embassy compound. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
85. I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 558, 17.
86. Days of Captivity, supra note 76, at A9, cols. 4-5.
87. Id. at col. 5.

88. Id. at A10, col. 1.
89. Id.; see I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 559, %23.
90. Days of Captivity, supra note 76, at A10, col. 1.
91. According to President Carter, speaking after his meeting with the hos-

tages in Wiesbaden, West Germany, the hostages had been subject to "acts of
barbarism that can never be condoned" and to abuse that was "much worse
than had been previously revealed." N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
92. Id.; Days of Captivity, supra note 76, at All, col. 1-5.
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months in captivity.9 3 Although the militants acted at first in an
apparently private capacity, 94 within a few days the government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran had endorsed the seizure, and
"[the] approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini
and other organs of the Iranian state, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated the continuing occupation of the Embassy
and detention of the hostages into acts of that State."95 Already
well known are the Iranian threats, issued at various times during
the 444-day crisis, to put the hostages on trial, or to kill them, if
various Iranian demands were not met, or if the United States
attempted military action against Iran.98 These threats and the
physical abuse of the hostages took place while negotiations for
the hostages' release continued, 7 and were an integral part of the
negotiating process itself, until the hostages were actually released.98 For example, in the closing hours of negotiating the escrow agreement and the transfer of funds, difficulties arose over
an eleven page appendix to the main agreement. Behzad Nabavi,
Iran's chief negotiator on the hostage issue, stated that if the
United States banks did not complete transfers to the escrow accounts in the Bank of England, "obviously we will take more severe action,"9 9 indicating that the hostages would be tried as
10 0
spies.
B.

The Applicable Law

As mentioned, 10 1 article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties may not automatically represent the applicable
international law between the United States and Iran since

93. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
94. I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 566-69, 56-74. During the first
few days after the embassy seizure, although the Iranian clergy and other leaders supported the hostage taking, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at Al, col. 5, the
Iranian government of Dr. Mehdi Bazargan officially promised to "do its best"
to free the hostages. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
95. I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 569, %74.
96. The militants began making public pronouncements to this effect on
November 6, 1979. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1979, at A14, col. 6.
97. See notes 1 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
98. The hostages were mistreated until they were placed on the Algerian jets
in which they left Iran. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
99. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A7, col. 5.
100. Id. at col. 6.
101. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
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neither party has ratified the Convention and since the Convention explicitly recognizes that it both codifies and changes customary public international law. 102 Thus, if the rule of article 52
is to govern the question of the hostage settlement agreement, it
must do
3 so because it is "declaratory of customary international

law. M0

According to the late Professor Richard R. Baxter, a multilateral treaty may be declaratory of customary international law1' 0 if
it "incorporat[es] and giv[es] recognition to a rule of customary
international law that existed prior to the conclusion of the treaty
...

."

5o

Such a treaty may be proven to be declaratory of inter-

national law in one of four ways:
[(I)] The treaty may state, generally in its preamble, that it is declaratory of customary international law.
[(2)] The final act of the conference that drew up the treaty or the
travaux preparatoireof the treaty may indicate that the entire
treaty was intended by its draftsmen to be declaratory of customary international law.
[(3)] The travaux preparatoiresfor a particular article may show
that the article was intended to be declaratory of customary international law, even though other provisions of the treaty were not.
[(4)] A comparison of the terms of a particular article with the
state of customary international law may indicate that the article
is an108 accurate formulation of a rule of customary international
law.
Even if the principles enumerated in a treaty "are not consistent
with what had hitherto been taken to be the state of customary
law,

107

the treaty may express agreed upon practices and is "to

be weighed together with all other consistent and inconsistent evidence of the state of customary international law."10 8
Because the preamble of the Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the treaty represents both codification and pro102. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, art. 52.
103. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, [1965-1966] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Baxter, Multilateral Treaties].
104. For categories of multilateral treaties that are not declaratory of customary international law, see id. at 276-77.
105. Id. at 277.
106. Id. at 287.
107. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, supra note 70, at 55.
108. Id. at 52; see note 70 supra.
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gressive development 1 9 and because of the conceptual and practical difficulties in proving the state of customary international law
at the time of the treaty's conclusion, 11 0 the travaux preparatoire
of article 52 must be examined to determine the drafters' intent."' In considering the predecessors of article 52 most members of the International Law Commission (ILC) recognized that
the rule against coerced treaties predated their discussions. 12 A
plurality of ILC members commenting on the existence of the
rule felt that it became a principle of customary international law
upon the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 or that
it was based upon the Charter. 1 Several held that it predated
the Charter.1 14 Others did not express an opinion as to the date of
the rule's creation, but acknowledged its existence, or stated that
it was already lex lata.1 15 Even those who expressed dissatisfaction with the particulars of the rule did not repudiate it or deny
its existence. 1 " Similarly, most delegates to the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties stated that the rule predated the
United Nations Charter 17 or was lex lata.118 At the Conference,
109. ' See note 70 supra.
110. For the development of the rule in customary international law, see
MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES, supra note 59. Regarding the conceptual difficulties of comparing the provisions of customary law at the time of the treaty's
conclusion, Professor Baxter also wrote that "[to determine [the treaty's] character by comparison of its provisions with customary international law is selfdefeating, since the state of customary international law is itself the effect of the
inquiry." Baxter, Treaties and Custom, supra note 70, at 56.
,111. See generally S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIEs: A GuIDE TO THE LEG-'
ISLATIVE HISTORY OP THE VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).
112. See id. at 286-89.
113. Summary Records of the 681st Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1963 [hereinafter cited as 1963 ILC Records]
(statement of Mr. Paredes, Ecuador); id., 682d Meeting, at 54-56 (statement of
Mr. Rosenne, Israel); id. at 58 (statement of Mr. Tabibi, Afghanistan); Summary
Records of the 827th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 31 (Part 1) U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966 [hereinafter cited at 1966 ILC Records].
114. E.g., 1963 ILC Records, supra note 113, at 53 (682d mtg.) (statement of
Mr. Verdross, Austria).
115. E.g., id. at 52 (681st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Castren, Finland); id. at 57
(682 mtg.) (statement of Mr. Tunkin, U.S.S.R.).
116. Id. at 54 (682d mtg.) (statement of Mr. Briggs, United States).
117. E.g., United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, FirstSession
Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11, at
273 (1969) [hereinafter cited as First Session Official Records] (48th mtg.)
(statement of Mr. Alcivar-Castillo, Eduador).
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Bulgaria and thirteen other states co-sponsored a successful
amendment 1 9 to establish that the rule against coerced treaties
antedated the Charter and to bind non-member states.120 Significantly, opposition to the Bulgarian amendment centered on its
possible effect on treaties concluded
before 1945, and did not go
12
to the existence of the rule itself. '

Most importantly, both Lauterpacht and Waldock, Special
Rapporteurs on the law of treaties, understood that in their formulations of article 52 they were "codifying, not developing the
law of nations in one of its most essential aspects."1 22 Only the
proposed but subsequently rejected 2" provisions calling for the
adjudication of claims were regarded as de lege frenda. 24 In its
report to the General Assembly, the ILC reiterated that "[tihe
invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force
is a principle which is lex lata in the international law of today.'

25

The ILC thus considered article 52 to be only a

118. E.g., id. at 281, (50th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Osiecki, Poland); id. at
284 (statement of Mr. Saulescu, Romania).
119. The Bulgarian (14 state) amendment inserted the italicized words in the
International Law Commissions's text: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/C. 1/L. 289 & Add. 1, reprinted in United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties, Firstand Second Sessions, Official Records, Documents of the
Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add. 2, at 172-73 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Conference Documents].
120. E.g., First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 273 (48th mtg.)
(statement of Mr. Smejkal, Czechoslovakia); id. (statement of Mr. Alcivar-Castillo, Ecuador).
121. E.g., id. at 293 (51st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Kearney, United States);
see MALAWER, COERCED TREATIES, supra note 60, at 10-15.
122. Lauterpacht, (First)Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41
63, reprintedin Documents of the Fifth Session [19531 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
90, 151, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1953/Add. 1 [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht, Report], quoted in Waldock, (SECOND) Report on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 & Add. 1-3, reprinted in Documents of the Fifteenth
Session, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1963/
Add. 1 [hereinafter cited as Waldock, Report].
123. See, e.g., Waldock, Report, supra note 122, at 51.
124. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122, at 150.
125. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 197, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1963/Add. 1. That article
52 codified, rather than developed, customary international law, has been recognized by most writers. See, e.g., MALAWER, IMPosED TREATIES, supra note 59, at
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codification.
Since state practice 2 6 and the opinions of writers12 7 support the
rule of article 52, and since the United States and Iran have
signed the Convention,1 28 article 52 must be regarded as governing the question whether coercion vitiated United States consent to the settlement agreement.
C.

The Definition of Force

1. "Force" as Defined by the International Law Commission
and the 1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties
Article 52 voids treaties procured through "the threat or use of
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied

in The Charter of the United Nations"; 129 therefore, the central

question in analyzing the validity of the instant treaties is the
meaning of "force." The major controversy in both the ILC's deliberation and the Vienna Conference over the meaning of "force"
was whether it encompassed economic and political pressure as
claimed by Third World and communist countries, or merely
physical force as maintained by certain western industrialized
countries.13 0
At the Vienna Conference the Australian delegates responded
to Third World and communist arguments that the United Nations Charter prohibited all forms of force, including economic
and political pressure, by arguing that article 2(4) of the Charter
156; A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961); I. SINCLAIR,
TION ON THE

THE VIENNA CONVEN-

LAW OF TREATIES 95-100 (1975); Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on

Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L., 495, 532-33 (1970); Nablik, The Grounds of Invalidity and Termination of Treaties, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 743 (1971).
126. See MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES, supra note 59.
127. See note 126 supra. But see Stone, De Victoribus Victis: The International Law Commission and Imposed Treaties of Peace, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 356
(1968) (criticism of article 52).
128. See note 72 supra.
129. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, art. 52.
130. See, e.g., First Session Official Records, supra note 117, (statement by
Mr. Saulescu, Romania). The amendment to include economic and political
pressure would have changed article 49 [52] to read: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force, including economic or
political pressure, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations." U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/C. 1/L. 67/Rev.1/Corr. 1, Reports of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/14 (1969), reprinted in Conference
Documents, supra note 119, at 172.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

864

[Vol. 14.847

was intended to prohibit only aggressive war.13 ' It is submitted
that neither of these positions accurately reflects the current definition of "force." Although the Third World's initiative failed to
expand the definition of "force,"1 2 the "legislative history" of article 52 shows that it includes most if not all forms of physical
violence and that a similar examination of the history of article
2(4) of the 2 rharter 5 s and related concepts 4 reinforces this
conclusion.
Debate on the scope of "force" occurred not only at the 19681969 Conference on the Law of Treaties, but stretches back to the
1953 report on the law of treaties by Sir Hersh Lauterpacht s5 in
which he proposed that "treaties imposed by or as the result of
the use of force or threats of force against a State" would be invalidated by the International Court of Justice at the request of
any state.' He noted that although the prohibition against the
use of force has its origin in pre-World War II developments, it
was the cumulative effect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the United Nations Charter
that prohibited the threat or use of force.13 7 Recognizing that his
formulation of the rule against coerced treaties followed the language of article 2(4) of the Charter, 3 8 Lauterpacht distinguished
between physical force and the threat of its use, and other types
of coercion.139 Conceding that the borderline between the two
types of coercion is not rigid, Lauterpacht held that only physical
force "however indirect invalidates a treaty and that war was
merely a subspecies of 'force.' "140 He would, however, also in-

131.

See, e.g., First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 282. (state-

ment of Mr. Harry, Australia).
132. See generally, e.g., I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 95-100 (1973); MALAWER, COERCED TREATIES, supra note 60, at 16-25.
133.

See text accompanying notes 187-219 infra.

134. See text accompanying notes 220-60 infra.
135. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122, at 90.

136. Id. at 147.
137. Id. at 148.
138. Id. at 149.
139. "The article refers to physical force or threats of physical force as dis-

tinguished from coercion not amounting to physical force." Id.
140. Id.

The merit of the formulation adopted in the Charter is that it obviates the
doubts, which gave rise to some uncertainty under the Covenant and the

Pact of Paris, as to whether in a particular case the use of force amounts
to war in the technical use of the term. Under the Charter and the article
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clude within the rubric of invalid imposed treaties those procured
by
attempts or threats to starve a state into submission by cutting off
its imports or its access to the sea, although no force is used directly against persons

.

. Neither would it appear to be essential

that compulsion this directly applied against a State should be the
result of a war or of other use of direct physical force.14, 1

Lauterpacht thus concluded that "the inevitably indefinite character of this cause of invalidity of treaties renders it particularly
necessary to make its operation dependent upon impartial determination as provided in this article.

'142

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the next Special Rapporteur, was less
sanguine about the possible effect of the prohibition against coerced treaties, and argued against such a prohibition, Fitzmaurice
urged the restriction of the types of force which might result in
the invalidity of a treaty:
The case must be explicitly confined to the threat or use of
physical force, since there are all too numerous ways in which a
State might allege that it had been induced to enter a treaty by
pressure of some kind, (e.g., economic). On this latter basis a dangerously wide door to the invalidation of treaties, and hence a
threat to4 the stability of the treaty making process would be
opened.1 1

The next Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, reinstated
a revised version of the prohibition against coerced agreements.
This version forbade treaties entered into "through an act of
force or threat of force, employed . . . in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. '144
Discussion in the ILC of Waldock's and subsequent revisions of
predecessors of article 52 reveal that the prohibition against the
use of force is wider than that suggested by the Australian delegate. 145 In the ILC's 1963 sessions on Waldock's draft article, discussion centered on three topics: the wording of the article,
as here formulated that distinction is devoid of relevance.
Id.

141. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122, at 149.
142. Id. at 149-50.
143. Fitzmaurice, (Third)Report on the Law of Treaties, [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 20, 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/115 (1968).
144. Waldock, Report, supra note 122, at 51.
145. See text accompanying notes 133 supra through 182 infra.
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whether a coerced treaty was void or voidable, and the scope of
the term "force." Shabtai Rosenne had proposed that the wording
of the draft article more closely follow that of article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. 146 His and similar suggestions were accepted 147 with the subsequent recognition that "article 2, paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the modern customary law regarding the threat or
use of force."148 With regard to whether a coerced treaty is void or
voidable, the vast majority of delegates believed that customary
49
law rendered such treaties absolutely void or void ab initio.1

The scope of the prohibition against the use of force provoked
more discussion. Those favoring expansion of the scope of the
prohibition to include economic and political pressure differentiated between "force" and "war," and apparently believed that
"force" was broader. For example, Mr. Yasseen of Iraq remarked
that while "[tihe Covenant of the League of Nations and other
international instruments had restricted the right to resort to
war, [t]he Charter of the United Nations prohibited the use or
threat of force. . .

."50 Mr.

Paredes of Ecuador argued that pro-

hibition against force "had been given full expression in the Charter of the United Nations and in the regional Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS]"'' 1 and that the wider
definition in OAS treaties 52 should be employed in this instance.
146. 1963 ILC Records, supra note 113, at 58 (682d mtg.).
147. Id. at 61 (683d mtg.) (statements of Sir H. Waldock, Special Rapporteur).
148. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Conference
Documents, supra note 119, at 67. The final draft of article 52 does not conform
to or expressly mention article 2(4) in order to (1) permit treaties to be imposed
on aggressors, (2) make the article binding on non-member states, 1963 ILC
Records, supra note 113, at 62 (683d mtg.) (statement of Sir H. Waldock, Special Rapporteur), and (3) avoid prejudicing later interpretation of the Charter,
id. at 59, %71 (682 mtg.) (statement of Mr. Arechaga, Chairman).
149. See, e.g., 1963 ILC Records, supra note 113, at 52 (681st mtg.) (statement of Mr. de Luna, Spain).
150. Id. at 56 (682d mtg.) (statement of Mr. Yasseen, Iraq).
151. Id. at 52 (681st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Paredes, Ecuador).
152. Mr. Paredes quoted article 11 of the 1933 Convention on the Rights and

Duties of States to the effect that "[t]he contracting States definitively establish
as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial
acquisitions or special advantages which have been gained by force, whether this
consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations,

or in any other effective coercive measure. . .

."

Id.
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Similarly, those who opposed expansion of "force" did not limit

"force" to "war," and in fact distinguished between the two concepts, although somewhat less frequently. Mr. Vendross of Austria held that the rule against imposed treaties was first recognized in the Stimson doctrine, under which the United States
declared that it would not recognize treaties wrought by war. 53
He also noted that this principle, although not explicitly stated,
was implicit in article 2(4)'s prohibition against force.15 4 Mr. Castren of Finland urged that political or economic pressure "should
be disregarded [as ground for invalidity, for] article 12 dealt with
physical force only." 155 Similarly, in the 1966 ILC session on the
law of treaties, Third World and other delegates argued that article 2(4) of the Charter had developed to encompass kinds of
"force" other than "armed" force. 5"
At the 1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, Third
World countries renewed the drive for including prohibitions
against economic and political pressure with the prohibition
against the use of force.

57

Mr. El-Dessouki of the United Arab

Republic championed this position, stating that economic pressure such as blockades could be as effective as military force, especially if the target country's economy relied upon one crop or
export product.158 Numerous Third World countries argued that
the Charter's definition of "force" was not restricted to "armed
force." 15 9 They urged that either the language of article 2(4) of
the Charter, which prohibits the use of force in violation of the
"Purposes of the United Nations," encompassed economic and
political pressure'6 ° because the meaning of "force" itself had expanded since the drafting of the Charter,' 6 ' or that economic and
political pressure was outside the spirit of the Charter.162 It is also

important to note the forms of "force" which those states sup153. Id. at 53 (682d mtg.) (statement of Mr. Vendross, Austria).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 52 (681st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Castren, Finland).
156. See, e.g., 1966 ILC Records, supra note 113, at 31 (statement of Mr. de
Luna, Spain).
157. See MALAWER, COERCED TREATIES, supra note 60, at 16.
158. FirstSession Official Records, supra note 117, at 274 (49th mtg.) (statement of Mr. El-Dessouki, United Arab Republic).
159. Id. at 270 (48th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Mercado, Bolivia).
160. Id. at 284 (50th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Saulescu, Romania).
161. Id. at 287-88 (51st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Dadzie, Ghana).
162. See, e.g., id. at 290-91 (51st mtg.) (statement of Mr. DeCastro, Spain).
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porting the Third World position considered to be within the rubric of physical or armed "force." In arguing for the expansion of
the definition of force, Mr. Mutale of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo stated:
[The] word "force" as employed in the United Nations Charter
and in Article 49[52] of the draft covered all forms of force starting

with threats and including in addition to bombardment, military
occupation, invasion or terrorism,more subtle forms such as technical and financial assistance and economic pressure in the conclusion of treaties.163
'Western and certain Latin American countries responded to
these arguments in five ways. The first response was made by Mr.
Harry of Australia who restricted the term "force" to a meaning
equivalent to war by stating that the prohibition "referred to
physical force, armed force of the type used by the aggressor powers in the war that was still raging when the Charter was drafted
at the San Francisco Conference." 164 Notions of political and economic pressure were not yet well enough "established in law to be
incorporated into the convention as a ground for invalidating a
treaty." 16 5 Other nations, such as Uruguay advanced a second response: "the expression 'the threat or use of force' was a timehonored and broad term embodied in the United Nations Charter, which did not exclude particularly serious cases of economic
or political coercion, such as economic blockade .

,,. 6 Accord-

ingly, "force" meant "armed force," whether used "overtly or in
well-known indirect" ways.16 7 The Third World amendment
"might give the impression. . . that these forms of pressure were

not at present covered" by the Charter. 68 The third response was
a policy argument that the inherent vagueness 6 9 of the term
"force and the difficulties in ascertaining when force vitiates a
163. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session Vienna, 9 April-22 May 1969, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11/Add. 1, at
100 (1970) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Second Session Official
Records].
164. First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 282 (50th mtg.).
165. Second Session Official Records, supra note 163, at 101 (20th mtg.)

(statement of Mr. Tsurvoka, Japan).
166. First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 276-77 (49th mtg.)
(statement of Mr. Arechaga, Uruguay).
167. Id. at 278 (statement of Mr. Almeida, Portugal).
168. Id. at 277 (statement of Mr. Arechaga, Uruguay).
169. Id.
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State's consent to a treaty make it unwise to broaden the definition. 170 Fourth, it was noted that it was inappropriate for the

Conference to expand the definition because such expansion
would amount to an interpretation of the Charter, a task already
entrusted to the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States. 171 Fifth, it was asserted that leaving "force" undefined would allow for subsequent interpretation of the Charter.172
The Conference compromised by removing the Third World
amendment. 3 and substituting in The Final Act of the Confer-

ence a "Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties 1 7 4 which pro-

vides, in relevant part, that the Conference "[s]olemnly condemns
the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to
perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation
of the principle of sovereign equality of States and freedom of
consent. ..

15

2. Meaning of "Principles of International Law" Embodied
in 76 The Charter of the United Nations
77
In the ILC's deliberations and at the Vienna Conference
three interpretations for the phrase "principles of international
law" were advanced. First, article 52 was designed so that it did
not interfere with the inherent right of self-defense as recognized

in the Charter.178 Second, article 52 could not interfere with a

state's right to impose a peace treaty upon an aggressor.' 7 Third,
170. Id. at 287 (50th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Devadder, Belgium).
171. Id. at 289 (51st mtg.) (statement of Mr. Maresca, Italy).
172. Id. at 276-77 (49th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Arechaga, Uruguay).
173. Id. at 465 (78th mtg.).
174. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 29/26 (1971), in Conference Documents, supra note 119, at
285.
175. Id.
176. For the meaning of "international law embodied in," see note 119
supra.
177. See note 163 supra.
178. E.g., 1963 ILC Records, supra note 113, at 57 (682d mtg.) (statement of
Mr. Tunkin, U.S.S.R.); id. at 62 (683d mtg.) (statement of Sir H. Waldock, Special Rapporteur).
179. E.g., First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 288 (51st mtg.)
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the term "principles" was used to bind states which were not
United Nations members.180 It has also been pointed out, however, that "[b]y emphasizing the principles of the Charter, the
article implies all those rules and practices of international law
which underlie the Charter provisions and which are of general
application today."18
It is submitted that article 52's prohibition on coerced treaties
has moved beyond that of treaties imposed by "aggressive use of
military force.

18s 2

The International Law Commission clearly dis-

tinguished between war and force,1 8 3 and even those favoring expansion of the term to include economic and political pressure
viewed terrorism as physical or armed force.18 4 Both those opposing and those favoring the inclusion of economic and political
pressure recognized that the term "force" was broad,185 and it was
finally agreed that "force" should remain undefined so that it
might be subject to future interpretations. 18 6
3. "Force" in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
Although the Third World and the industrialized West split
over the scope and effective date of the prohibition against coerced treaties, most nations agreed that the rule was established
as of the date of the adoption of article 2(4)187 of the United Nations Charter, if it did not actually flow from the article. 88 Thus,
both reliance on and the ambiguity of article 2(4) of the Charter,
which prohibits threats or use of force only against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations in drafting
article 52, and the disputes in the ILC and in the 1969 Vienna
Conference on The Law of Treaties necessitate an examination of
the legislative history of the Charter provisions.
Article 2(4) of the Charter is a lineal descendant of chapter 2,
(statement of Mr. Khlestov, U.S.S.R.).
180. E.g., Conference Documents, supra note 119, at 66; 1963 ILC Records,
supra note 113, at 53 (682d mtg.) (statement of Mr. Vendross, Austria).
181.

182.
183.
184.
185.

T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 170-71 (1974).
MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES, supra note 59, at 7, 9.
See text accompanying notes 150-56 supra.
See text accompanying notes 153-55 supra.
See text accompanying note 163 supra.

186. See text accompanying note 172 supra.

187. For the text of article 2(4), see note 46 supra.
188.

See text accompanying notes 147-49.
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article 4 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization (DOP), which provided that "[a]l members
of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the Organization."' 89 As part of the preparation
for the United Nations Conference on International Organization
in May and June 1945, governments were invited to submit comments on, and suggestions for the amendment of the DOP. 190
These comments and suggested amendments revealed that although governments generally supported chapter 2, article 4 as
then formulated, they believed that the provisions should be
strengthened by making it more specific.
Amendments came primarily from Latin American and smaller
nations and can be placed into four categories. First, Belgium and
Uruguay proposed amendments based on the Stimson non-recognition doctrine. 191 Bolivia believed that the Charter had to contain "a double and reciprocal guaranty among.

. .

members":

[T]he first, concerning the territorial inviolability of the states, the
legal validity of acquisitions of territory which may originate in
acts of force or other means of compulsion not being recognized;
and the second, concerning respect for the political independence
of the states and the right which they possess to develop freely192in
their internal life, without the intervention of any other state.
Uruguay carried this sentiment further by requesting that members of the United Nations undertake "the obligation of maintaining, even by armed force, the integrity of rights and the frontiers of the countries threatened or attacked."' 93
The second category of amendments came from countries such
as Chile, 9
Mexico,' 95 and Paraguay. 96 These countries commented that "nonintervention in the domestic or foreign affairs of
another State" should form "one of the fundamental principles of
189. Doc. 1, 6/1, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 1, 3 (1945).
190. Doc. 3, 6/2, (1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. at 2.
191. For an explanation of the Stimson nonrecognition doctrine, see R.
RELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 537-38, 540 (3d ed. 1975).
192. Doc. 2, G/14(4), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 578 (1945).
193. Doc. 2, G/7(a), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. at 30.

194. Doc. 2, G/7(i), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. at 283.
195. Doc. 2, G/7(c), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. at 65-66.

196. Doc. 2, G/7(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. at 347.

FAR-
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international harmony.' 1 97 Third, Chile, drawing upon the Kellogg-Briand Pact, advocated the "abandonment of war as an instrument of national policy,"1 98 while Costa Rica proposed that
the phrase "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
Organization" be dropped from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
"in order that the principle of abstention from the use of force
may be absolute." 199 Last, Norway, Panama, and Ecuador advanced amendments proposing that force be forbidden except
where approved by the Organization.20 "
The principles advanced by Bolivia and others resulted in the
adoption of the Australian amendment, which stated that "[a]ll
members of the organization shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any member or state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' 20 1 Small states20 2 remained unsatisfied, however, and supported a proposal by New Zealand requiring "[a]ll members of
the Organization [to] undertake collectively to resist every act of
aggression against any member. ' 20 3 Delegates from the United
States and the United Kingdom spoke against the amendment,
which was defeated. 20 " They pointed out that it would narrow the
obligation of members to cover only instances of aggression, that
an aggressor might escape collective action by calling its act "by
some other name," and that it was similar to provisions of the
Covenant of the League of Nations that the United States had
earlier found unacceptable.20 5
Certain nations continued to express concern over possible
loopholes in the prohibition against the threat or use of force, in-

197. Doc. 2, G/7(i), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 283.
198. Id.
199. Doc. 2, G/7(h), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 274.
200. Doc. 2 G/7(n)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 366 (Norway); Doc. 2, G/7(p), 3
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 399 (Ecuador); Doc. 2, G/7(8)(2), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 270
(Panama).
201. Doc. 739, I/1/A/19(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 720"(1945).
202. The delegates from Belgium spoke in favor of the New Zealand proposal
and the Panamanian delegate offered a proposal which would have added'the
phrase "and to preserve against aggression the territorial integrity and political
independence of all Members." Doc. 778, 1/1/26, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 342-46.
203. Id. at 342.

204. Id. at 346.
205. Id. at 344-46.
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cluding situations in which the use of force might be lawful, and
the types of force, if any, that might be employed legally under
the Charter. "Various delegates" "pointed out that the phraseology of paragraph four might leave it open to a member state to
use force in some manner consistent with the purposes of the Organizatidn but without securing the assent of the organization to
such use of force.

' 20 6

The Brazilian delegate also suggested that

"apart from the use of legitimate self-defense, the text as it stood
might well be interpreted as authorizing the use of force unilaterally by a state, claiming that such action was in accordance with
the purposes of the Organization.

' 207

Delegate views on the que-

ries thus posed indicate the broad scope of chapter 2, article 4 of
the DOP. For example, in response to the Brazilian delegate's interpretation, the Belgian delegates stated that the changes in the
original text, especially the phrase "in any other manner," covered the problem. 208 The Norwegian delegate added that he fa-

vored clarification of the Committee report to reflect the notion
that paragraph 2(4) "did not contemplate any use of force,
outside of action by the Organization, 209 going beyond iindividual
or collective self-defense." He proposed that the phrase "territorial integrity and political independence" be eliminated "as being
unnecessary in light of the Charter provisions.

'210

The United

Kingdom delegate stated that he did not disagree with the Norwegian delegate's reasoning, but thought that the amended text
1
avoided conflict with the Charter's enforcement provisions. 21 Significantly, he "made it clear that the intentions of the authors of
the original text was to state in the broadest of terms an all incluwas
sive prohibition"; the phrase "or in any other manner"
'21 2

designed to insure that there should be no loopholes.
The delegate 213 to the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference on the Law

of Treaties correctly noted, with regard to the specific types of
force permitted, that the 1945 San Francisco conference had rejected a Brazilian amendment that would have forbidden eco206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Doc. 283, 1/1/19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 304.
Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 335.
Id.

213.

First Session Official Records, supra note 117, at 282 (50th mtg.) (state-

ment of Mr. Harry, Australia).
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nomic pressure.2 14 Consideration of a Norwegian amendment revealed, however, that although economic force was not banned,
the prohibition against force was broader than that against the
"territorial integrity and political independence" of states. Norway proposed that chapter 2, paragraph 4, be amended to enjoin
"the threat of force and from any use of force not approved by
the Security Council as a means of implementing the purposes of
the Organization.12 15 According to the Rapporteur,
The Committee likes it to be stated in view of the Norwegian
amendment to the same paragraph that the unilateraluse of force
or similar coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The
use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and
unimpaired. The use of force, therefore, remains legitimate only to
back up the decisions of the Organization at the start of a controversy or during its solution in the way that the Organization itself
ordains. The intention of the Norwegian amendment is thus cov216
ered by the present text.
Thus, to offend article 2(4) a party need not violate a state's
"territorial integrity or political independence." The discussion of
force was not designed to be restrictive but rather to offer certain
guarantees to small nations. 217 Article 2(4) prohibits not only blatant uses of force such as Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, but
also any threat or use of force contrary to the "[p]urposes of the
United Nations. 2 18 Furthermore, the prohibitions on threats of
2 19
force widen even further the scope of forbidden actions.
4.

"Force" in the Declaration Concerning the Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation

Throughout the ILC's deliberations on article 52, western states
countered Third World and Soviet bloc arguments that article 52
should explicitly invalidate treaties procured through the use of
214. Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334-35 (1945).
215. Doc. 2, G/7(n)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 366.
216. Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 400 (emphasis added). Identical
language is retained in a subsequent report. Doc. 944, 1/1/34(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. at 459.
217.

I.

BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

(1963).
218. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2(4).
219. See BROWNLIE, supra note 217, at 364.

267
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economic and political pressures2 20 by referring to the work of the
Special Committee on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States (Declaration of Friendly Relations). Western states argued that it was
not the province of the ILC to interpret the Charter,22 1 that the
Special Committee was charged with considering the seven basic
principles of international law, 222 and that to pass on the question
of the inclusion of economic and political force would be to usurp
the Special Committee's role.2 23 Thus, an analysis of the Declaration on Friendly Relations must supplement any interpretation of
article 52.224
The relevant portions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations
buttress the conclusion that the prohibition on the threat or use
of force is broader than the prohibition on the use of regular military forces to change the international frontiers of a state or to
extinguish a state's independence. For example, the first principle
of the Declaration, that "states shall refrain from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, ' ' 225 resulted in much disagreement
between Eastern bloc and nonaligned states, which desired to expand the principle, and Western states, which wanted to insure
that their inherent right to self-defense not be impaired and that
the legitimacy of wars of national liberation not be recognized. 226
The first paragraph of the Declaration explicating this principle,
and efforts to expand the definition of "force" to include economic and political pressures, were repulsed despite efforts to
raise the base figure for the quantum of pressure necessary to

220. See text accompanying -note 171 supra.
221. Id.
222. Note, The Declaration of Friendly Relations, 12 HARv. INT'L L.J. 509,
509 (1971); Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 713 (1971);
Houben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
CooperationAmong States, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 703 (1967).
223. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
225. Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. .2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028(1921) [hereinafter cited as Friendly Relations
Declaration].
226. Houben, supra note 222, at 705.
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trigger the prohibition on the use of force. 227 Paragraph four establishes that states must refrain from the threat or use of force
"to violate the existing international boundaries of another state
or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of states."2 2' 8
Thus, this paragraph is "merely a special case of the general prohibition . . . and was inserted because of the historic importance
of the use of force across boundaries. '229 This provision complements the second principle of the Declaration, that "states shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered."2' 30 Consistent with this principle, "state parties to
an international dispute. . . shall refrain from any action which
may aggravate the situation so as to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, and shall act in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations."2' 1 The Declaration further provides that "the parties to a dispute have the
duty, in the event of the failure to reach a solution by any one of
the above peaceful means23 2 to continue to seek a settlement of
the dispute by other peaceful means agreed upon by them. "233
Thus, a combination of the prohibition on the threat or use of
force to solve international disputes and the obligation to use
only peaceful means to settle disputes, even when the enumerated
methods have failed, establish an almost absolute obligation to
avoid the use of force in settling disputes. Furthermore, the Declaration recognizes that the prohibition against the use of force
can be offended without violating a state's boundaries or causing
the victim state to cease its separate existence.
5.

Force and the Definition of Aggression

Attempts to define aggression antedate the League of Na-

227. Third World States would consider economic pressure to offend article

2(4) of the Charter only when it threatened the territorial integrity of political
independence of states. See Houben, supra note 222, at 707.
228. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 225, art. 1,
229. Rosenstock, supra note 222, at 718.
230. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 225, art. 2.
231. Id.
232. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
233. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 225.
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tions.234 Active development of the definition in the United Nations, however, dates from the early 1950s when the Soviet Union,
angered at United Nations actions in Korea, and smaller states,
fearful for their safety, pushed for a comprehensive definition.235
The Definition of Aggression (Definition) adopted by the General
Assembly in 1974236 is primarily for the use of the Security Council in its enforcement activities.237 It should be noted that aggression is not the most serious act threatening peace; aggression is
but one type of activity along a continuum of hostile acts that
may endanger peace and security.238
Article 1 of the Definition provides that "[aiggression is the
use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
set out in this definition. '2 9 Article 1 of the Definition is thus
more restrictive than article 2(4) of the Charter. First, the Definition requires the use of "armed force," but article 2(4) refers only
to "force. '240 Second, although article 2(4) states that "[m]embers
shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force," the Definition

omits threats from activities constituting aggression.24 ' Third, the
Definition phrase "in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations . .242

contrasts with article

2(4)'s requirement that the threat or use of force not be "incon234.

1 B.

FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR

WORLD PEACE 4-6

(1975).

235. 2 id. at 1-3.
236. Definition, supra note 39, reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, supra note 234, at
15.
237. Id. at 2d preambular paragraph. According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with determining "the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
238. See, e.g., as to the difference between aggression and offensive war, 2
FERENCZ, supra note 234, at 64 n.132 (citing DE VISCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

303-06 (1968)).

239. Definition, supra note 39, art. 1.
240. This is consistent with the rejection of economic and political forces as
aggression. 2 FERENCZ, supra note 234, at 30.
241. See Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154 Recueil des Cours 299,
342 (1977); 2 FERENCZ, supra note 234, at 29.
242. Definition, supra note 39, at 143.
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sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."24 At least one
commentator has suggested that the primary purpose of these
modifications is to insure states' inherent right to self-defense,244
which arises when a member of the United Nations suffers an
"armed attack" and exists only until the Security Council "has
taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and
2' 45
security.

Article 2 of the Definition is a compromise between backers of
2 47 principles. It provides
the priority 246 and animus aggressionis
that the "first use of armed force by a State in contravention of
the Charter 248 shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression," but the Security Council may find otherwise in light
249
of "other relevant circumstances" or if the acts are de minimus.
Subject to article 4 of the Definition, which states that the Security Council may determine other acts to constitute aggression, 3 °
article 3 lists types of acts that "shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as. .. act[s] of aggression.

' 25 1

Included in this nonexhaustive list are invasion and

annexation of territory,5 2 bombardment or use of weapons
against another state's territory, 53 blockade,254 violation of a
troop stationing agreement, 255 and allowing territory to be used
for aggression against a third state. 5 6 More noteworthy in dealing
with the Iranian situation are paragraphs 3(d) and 3(g). Article
3(d) includes in the category of aggressive acts "[a]n attack by
243.
244.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
Broms, supra note 241, at 343. There is some dispute, however, as to

the meaning of these changes. See 2 FERENCZ, supra note 234, at 29, and sources
collected at 63 n.123.
245.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

246. For an explanation of the priority principle, see 2 FERENZ, supra note
234, at 31.
247. See id.
248. It is unknown whether this deviation from article 2(4) is significant.
249. Broms, supra note 241, at 344-47.
250. "The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of
the Charter." Definition, supra note 39, art. 4.
251. Id. art. 3.
252. Id. art. 3(a).
253. Id. art. 3(b).
254. Id. art. 3(c).
255. Id. art. 3(e).
256. Id. art. 3(f).
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the armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another state. 2 57 Article 3(g) includes

"[t]he sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another state of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed above,25 or its substantial involvement therein.

'259

Article

3, however, is qualified by article 7, which states that nothing in
the Definition of article 3 may "prejudice the right of self-determination. . . of peoples forcibly deprived of that right. . nor of
the right of these people to struggle to that end. '2 60 Aggression,

therefore, is one of the most serious acts threatening peace; and
although aggression is a subspecie of "force," it requires the offending state to commit more grievous and unambiguous acts,
such as actual invasion and annexation, than the mere threatening of a state's "territorial integrity and political independence.

'261

D. The Question of Causation
Related to the question of the kind and amount of force necessary to invalidate a treaty is the issue of when the application of
threats or force concludes the allegedly void treaty. Although to
be void under article 52 a treaty must be "procured" 26 2 through
the threat or use of force, procurement is a vague concept as there
are few cases discussing the matter. The issue is addressed only
1 3 In his 1953
briefly in the travaux preparatoiresof the article.26
2
6
4
report on the law of treaties Sir Hersh Lauterpacht proposed
that "[t]reaties imposed by or as ihe result of the use of force or
threats of force against a State in violation of the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations are invalid if so declared by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the request of any
State. '265 The consequences of a finding by the ICJ of such

257. Id. art. 3(d).
258. See text accompanying notes 252-57 supra.
259. Definition, supra note 39, art. 3(g).
260. Id. art. 7.

261. Id. art. 1.
262. Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, art. 52.

263. As to state practice on this point,

see MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES,

supra note 59, at 89-106.
264. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122.
265. Id. at 151 art. 12.
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threats or use of force 26 0 were to be severe. Treaties resulting
from the threat or use of force were void, not voidable.267 The
coerced state could not choose to deny part of the treaty and affirm the rest, or affirm the whole treaty.2 68 According to Lauterpacht, "[t]he attitude of acquiescence or apparent acquiescence
on the part of the coerced party is irrelevant. 26 9 Furthermore,
under Lauterpacht's proposal an international tribunal would not
be competent to determine if any portions of the coerced treaty
were fair and reasonable.27 0 It would be impossible to determine if
any portion of the coerced treaty could be "intrinsically reasonable" since force was necessary to its conclusion.27 1 Allowing an in-

ternational tribunal to affirm the fairness of the treaty might7 le2
gitimize the coercion, contrary to international public policy.

Considering the type of threat or quantum of force that would
cause the treaty to fall within the ambit of the prohibition, Lauterpacht indicated that "coercion, however indirect, if resulting
from an unlawful use of force or threats of force invalidates a
treaty."'27 3 Apparently, although the coercion itself may be indi-

rect, the illegal use or threat of force must rise to a certain level
to constitute "coercion":
This means that a treaty is invalid if a state, as a result of unlawful
use of force, has been reduced to such a degree of impotence'as to
be unable to resist the pressure to become a party to a treaty although at the time of signature no obvious attempt
is made to im2 74
pose upon it by force the treaty in question.
Thus, although under Lauterpacht's proposal indirect force alone
may trigger the sanction, his concept of coercion requires such a
strong threat that many instances involving the indirect use of
force would not fall within his concept of prohibited force.
Whether the threshold is as high as Lauterpacht maintains is
questionable for several reasons. First, previous cases of treaty in266. For Lauterpacht's views on the definition of force, see text accompanying notes 139-41 supra.
267. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122, at 151.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 151-52.
273. Id. at 149.
274. Id.
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validation do not appear to require that the coerced state be impotent.275 In its letters to the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Cases, 276 Iceland alleged that a 1961 international fishing rights
agreement between it and the United Kingdom was imposdd by
force.2 77 The alleged illegal use of force was the presence of the
Royal Navy in waters near Iceland during the negotiation of the
agreement.

7

The Court rejected Iceland's contention, stating

that "a court cannot consider an accusation of this serious nature
on the grounds of vague general charges unfortified by the evidence .... ,,279 Thus, the primary basis for the Court's, rejection
of Iceland's claim was evidentiary, and not that the claim, if supported by adequate proof, would render the treaty void.280 The

ICJ also examined the circumstances surrounding the conclusion
of the agreement, however, and concluded that "[t]he history of
the negotiations which led up to the 1961 Exchange of Notes
reveals that these instruments were freely negotiated by the interested parties on the basis of perfect equality and freedom of
decision on both sides."28 1 Thus, the ICJ opinion indicated that
when the circumstances of an agreement's conclusion demonstrate that it was "freely negotiated

. . .

on the basis of perfect

equality and freedom of decision on both sides," 8 the agreement
will be valid, and, by implication, that cases not involving negotiations as "free" as those between the United Kingdom and Iceland may render a treaty void.
In his dissenting opinion,28 3 Judge Padillo Nervo suggested that
a lower quantum of force or proof is necessary to establish
invalidity:
275. See note 263 supra.
276. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 3

(jurisdiction), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (merits).
277. See MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES, supra note 59, at 142-46.
278. Id. at 144.
279. [1973] I.C.J. 58-59 (jurisdiction).
280.

See MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES, supra note 59, at 145.

281. [1973] I.C.J. 49, 58-59.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 46-47. Policy grounds also militate against imposing too high a
standard of causation for invocation of the rule. If a state must be proven "impotent to resist pressure to become a party to a treaty," Lauterpacht, Report,
supra note 122, at 149, a high standard may encourage coerced states to resort
to an illegal use of force themselves, or the fear that failure to do so may result
in their later being obliged to honor the treaty.
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A big power can use force and pressure against a small state in
many ways, even by the very fact of diplomatically insisting on
having its view recognized and accepted. The Royal Navy did not
need to use armed force and its mere presence on the seas inside
28 4
the fishery limits of the constant state could be enough pressure.
Thus, although the impotence of the coerced state will ensure the
invalidity of the imposed treaty, such impotence is not required
by all authorities. The standard of causation is relatively low,
therefore: The coerced state need not be impotent in all respects
but merely impotent to resist the pressure to join the treaty, and
this coercion can be effected by the indirect threat of force.
E.

Iran's Conduct as Invalidating the Hostage Settlement
Agreement
1.

Iran's Conduct as an Illegal Use of Force

The seizure of the United States embassy by Iran, the physical
abuse of the hostages, and threats to kill or try the hostages made
during the course of the negotiations for their release appear to
constitute a violation of the concept of thle threat or use of force
within the meaning of article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
although it most probably does not rise to the level of aggression.
Aggression. Iran's seizure of the United States embassy most
likely cannot be considered aggression because the seizure did not
constitute the use of "armed force" against "the territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations." ' 5 Although
weapons facilitated the seizure, 286 "armed force" as used in the
Definition of Aggression is a narrower concept that the definition
of "force" under article 2(4) of the Charter. Independently of the
"territorial integrity" language, "armed force" seems to require
the violation of a State's borders. Although the precise intent of
the drafters is unclear,28 7 the deviation from the text of article
2(4) in the Definition of Aggression was designed primarily to in284.
285.
various
infra.
286.
287.

[1973] I.C.J. 4, 46-47.
Definition, supra note 39, art. 1. This is supported by the statements of
individuals throughout the crisis. See text accompanying notes 327
See text accompanying note 84 supra.
See 2 FERENCZ,supra note 234, at 29, and sources collected at 62 n.123.
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sure States' rights to self-defense, in "armed attack" situations. 2ss
Armed attack is generally defined as an organized "offensive"
"trespass" across a states' frontiers and does not include "sporadic operations by armed bands."28 9 Nevertheless, Brownlie has
pointed out that
it is conceivable that a coordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity
of the government of a state from which they operate, would constitute an 'armed attack,' more especially if the object were the forcible settlement of a dispute or the acquisition of territory. 20
But even Brownle's exception implies the necessity of a frontier
crossing or outside sponsorship of in-state activity; armed attack
does not contemplate "internal disorders. '291 Therefore, the
seizure of the embassy by a small private group of Iranian students, does not qualify as aggression, even though the militant
students' actions might have been accomplished with the apparent complicity of the Iranian authorities29 2 and was subsequently
endorsed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, because the embassy
seizure appears to be the product of internal disorders and not to
involve a frontier crossing or outside sponsorship.
The enumeration of acts qualifying as acts of aggression in article 3 of the Definition reinforces the notion that aggression requires a violation of a State's frontiers and that Iran's actions did
not rise to that level. Article 3 lists such acts as invasion and annexation of, or the bombardment of, or the use of weapons
against, another state's territory; or "an attack by the armed
forces of a state on the land, sea, or air forces . . . of another
state; or "the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands,
groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another state. '293 Although at least one commentator has suggested that embassy grounds constitute State territory
for purposes of the Definition,2 9 4 the modern law of diplomatic
immunity rejects extra-territoriality as a fiction and considers

288.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

289. BROWNLIE, supra note 217, at 278.
290. Id. at 279.
291. Id. at 278 n.5.
292. See text accompanying notes 84-85 for the acts that may have involved
the Iranian authorities' complicity in the seizure.
293. See text accompanying notes 252-56 supra.
294. MALAWER, supra note 36.
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both embassy grounds and diplomatic personnel as "inviolable.". 95 The incidental presence of Marine guards at the embassy 296 should not render Iran's actions an attack on the "land,

sea, or air
forces" of another State, and the requirement of a
"sending 2 97 of armed bands or irregulars also implies a border
crossing. Furthermore, as the ICJ has noted, Iran's conduct in
seizing the embassy constituted a violation of the principles of the
United Nations Charters; 298 it did not violate the Definition because it did not violate the Charter itself.
2. Article 2(4) and the Declaration of Friendly Relations
Although the clearest violation of article 2(4) is crossing another country's borders to take territory or to extinguish its existence as a State, the prohibition in article 2(a) on the threat or
use of force is much broader. As mentioned, a number of delegations to the 1945 San Francisco Conference supported amendments that would have forbidden all use of force, except where
approved by the United Nations. 299 Others, in response to queries
about the possible effect of the phrase "territorial integrity or political independence"300 pointed out that the framers intended "to
state in the broadest terms an all-inclusive prohibition."301 Both
the "unilateral use of force" and "similar coercive measures"
were covered by article 2(4).02 Thus, it is submitted that article
2(4)'s broad language encompasses Iran's seizure of the embassy
and subsequent threats to kill or try the hostages.
This conclusion is buttressed by consideration of the relevant
portions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The first principle of the Declaration essentially restates article 2(4) and is*
thereby also offended by Iran's actions.303 Paragraph one of the
Declaration on Friendly Relations which explicates the principle
forbidding the threat or use of force to violate the "existing inter-

295.
U.S.T.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23
3217, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, art. 22.
See text accompanying note 88 supra.
Definition, supra note 39, art. 3(g).
I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 573, 1 91.
See text accompanying note 200 supra.
See text accompanying note 210 supra.
See text accompanying note 212 supra.
See text accompanying note 216 supra.
Rosenstock, supra note 222, at 717.
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national boundaries of another state or as a means of solving international disputes, ' ' 30 4 is simply a special case of the general

prohibition on the use of force,305 thus confirming the broad scope
of the prohibition in article 2(4). Iran's actions appear to violate
paragraph one which forbids the use of force to solve any international disputes, especially since Iran failed to use all peaceful
means at its disposal to settle
disputes with the United States
30 6
over the return of the Shah.

Force under article 52. Although the definition of force under
article 52 is coextensive with the definition under article 2(4), the
conclusion that Iran's actions offend article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is also supported by the discussion offered by the framers of article 52. Both Lauterpacht and
Fitzmaurice explained that only "physical force" could invalidate
treaties, if indeed they could be voided. 0 The term "physical
force," although undefined, distinguishes and excludes economic
pressure,30 8 and Lauterpacht noted that even indirect physical
force, invalidated treaties. 0 Since "physical force" encompasses
nearly all forms of physical pressures, Iran's seizure of the embassy and subsequent threats to kill or try the hostages constitute
the threat or use of force within the meaning of article 52.
Iran's conduct also constitutes force according to the various
explanations expounded during the 1969 Vienna Conference on
the Law of Treaties. Third World delegates ruled that all forms of
force, and not merely armed force, were prohibited; 310 the Irani-

ans who captured and held the embassy were clearly armed. The
Uruguayan delegates noted that "force" was a broad term including more serious forms of economic and political pressure; 311 Iran
attempted to exercise this type of pressure. Furthermore, Third
World delegates noted that armed force included terrorism, 1 2
and the Conference itself condemned all forms of force or

304. Id. at 717 n.8.
305. Id. at 717.
306. See text accompanying notes 232-33 supra.
307. See text accompanying notes 140-43 supra.
308. Id.
309. Lauterpacht, Report, supra note 122, at 149.
310. FirstSession Official Records, supra note 117, at 270 (48th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Mercado, Bolivia).
311. Id. at 276-77 (49th mtg.) (statement of Mr. Arechaga, Uruguay).
312. Second Session Official Records, supra note 163, at 100.
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pressure313
Iran's actions also offend the language in article 58 which prohibits treaties imposing threats of force in violation of the "principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations." 314 According to the International Court of Justice,
"[t]here is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of
relations between states . . . than the inviolability of diplomatic
envoys and embassies ....
315 Even if Iran's actions do not expressly fall within the already recognized reach of "force," the International Law Commission felt "that the precise scope of the
acts covered . . . should be left to be determined in practice by
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter." 316 This
broad interpretation indicates that the prohibition can be expanded to cover Iran's conduct.
The conclusion that Iran's actions constitute an illegal use of
force is buttressed by official statements made during the course
of the crisis. The ICJ repeatedly3 1 7 referred to the seizure of the
embassy as an "attack, ' ' 8s "armed attack,"3 119 "assault,"3 20 or "invading force"'32 ' by an "armed group '322 that constituted "coercive action" 323 against the United States. The court also observed
that "[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and
to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is
in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations .
*.".., In contrast to this was the
ICJ's treatment of the United States attempted military rescue of
the hostages in April 1980.25 The court described these United
States actions as "operations," or "rescue operations" or an "in-

313. See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra.
314. See text accompanying notes 176-81 supra.
315. I.C.J. Iran Judgment, supra note 76, at 573, 91.
.316. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries in Conference
Documents, supra note 119, at 66, 3.
317. I.C.J. Iran Judgments, supra note 76, at 574, 1 95. These statements
were issued in conjunction with the ICJ judgment ordering Iran to release the
hostages and pay reparations.
318. Id. at 559, %24.
319. Id. at 566, %57.
320. Id. at 558, %18.
321. Id. 17.
322. Id. at 557, %14.
323. Id. at 572, 1 87.
324. Id. at 573, q 91.
325. Id. at 560, 32.
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cursion" into Iranian territory. 26 Similarly, though most delegates were careful to avoid inflaming Iran in debate in the Security Council on the resolution calling on Iran to free the hostages,
Mr. N'Dong of Gabon regretted that the embassy should be the
"object of aggression. ' ' 327
3.

The Question of Causation

The final question in considering whether Iran's action invalidates the agreement is whether the agreement was "procured"
through the illegal threat or use of force: Does the seizure of the
embassy fourteen months prior to the conclusion of the agreement and Iran's continued threats throughout the course of negotiations vitiate the United States consent to the agreement despite the appearance of lengthy negotiations between the two
countries and concessions by Iran to the United States? 328 Although the treaty was not militarily imposed upon the United
States, Lauterpacht's analysis would suggest that the United
States was "reduced to such a degree of impotence as to be unable to resist the pressure to become a party" to the treaty.2 9
Iran's seizure of the embassy and threats during the negotiating
process constituted sufficient pressure to cause the United States
to accede to an otherwise objectionable agreement, or to include
331
otherwise objectionable terms.3 3 0 But, as previously discussed,
the ICJ has suggested a less stringent requirement of causation:
that an agreement that is not freely negotiated may be invalid. 3 2
Use of this or similar standards suggested by Judge Nervo's dissenting opinion in the FisheriesJurisdictionCase333 suggests that
the hostage settlement agreement was illegally procured by force.

326. Id. at 573, %93.
327. U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1980, at 8.
328. For example, Iran agreed to pay off all bank loans and to commit nationals' claims to international arbitration. See Claims Settlement Declaration,
supra note 8.

329.
330.
United
331.
332.
333.

See text accompanying note 274 supra.
The return of frozen Iranian assets which might have been used to pay
States claims against Iran is an example of an objectionable term.
See text accompanying notes 275-82 supra.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 284-85 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Since the hostage settlement agreement falls within the ambit
of article 52, the potential domestic and international effects of
the agreement must be considered. The basic international impact is stated in article 52: a treaty is "void" if procured by duress. The International Law Commission clearly rejected characterizing such treaties as voidable,3 4 and called them void ab
initio.35 None of the provisions in a void ab initio treaty may be
salvaged because
this would enable the State concerned to take its decision in regard
to the maintenance of the treaty in a position of full legal equality
with the other State. If therefore, the treaty were maintained in
force, it would in effect be by the conclusion of a new treaty and
act by the recognition of the validity of a treaty procured by means
contrary to the most fundamental principles of the Charter of the
United Nations. 336

Thus, although the Commission regards treaties procured by duress as void, uncertainty is created by the proviso that these treaties may be "maintained in force." Further uncertainty is created
by article 65 of the Convention, which establishes procedures to
be followed upon assertion of the invalidity of a treaty. According
to article 65, a party must notify other parties of its claim 7 when
it invokes a ground to invalidate a treaty. If after three months
neither party objects to the claim of invalidity, the party claiming
invalidity may declare the treaty void. 3 8 If a party objects, however, the parties must "seek a solution" under article 33 of the
United Nations Charter. 3 Article 70 of the Convention provides
that "[a] treaty the validity of which is established under the pre34 0
sent Convention is void . . . [and has] no legal force.
A contradiction thus exists in the legal force accorded treaties
procured by duress and the procedures established by the Convention. Although a coerced treaty is void ab initio, its invalidity
must be asserted by the coerced state and "established" by the
334.

Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, in Confer-

ence Documents, supra note 119, at 66, 6.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id. at 66-67.
Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, art. 65(1).
Id. art. 65(2), art. 67(2).
Convention on Treaties, supra note 37, art. 65(3).
Id. art. 70(1).
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required steps. 4 ' If articles 65 and 70 do not represent a condition of customary law on these points 342 however, they may not be
applicable to the treaty between the United States and Iran.
If articles 65 and 70 do not represent customary law, the question, aside from whether the President has the constitutional
power to conclude a self-executing agreement of this type,13 is
whether the Supremacy Clause3 44 presumes an internationally legal treaty. Although a treaty has never been declared unconstitutional, the courts have reserved this right 45 and there are historical 346 and case precedent 347 indications from the Founding
Fathers that the requirements of international law provide standards which all treaties must meet. But the political question34 s
and act of state3 49 doctrines may block consideration of the legality of the agreements. The application of these doctrines of selfimposed, judicial restraint, however, would be inappropriate in
cases involving the validity of a treaty. Although a President may
invoke his own enumerated and implied powers35 0 to conclude
self-executing international agreements, the grant of the treatymaking power to the Senate in the Constitution suggests that
greater scrutiny be given executive agreements:
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the
entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years'
duration. It has been remarked, upon another occasion, and the
remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary. monarch, though
341.

See generally Briggs, Procedures for Establishing the Invalidity or

Termination of Treaties Under the InternationalLaw Commission's 1966 Draft
Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 976, 977-78 (1967).

342. According to Briggs, the "boldest innovations" in the convention are in
those articles dealing with procedures regarding nullity, invalidity, and termination. Id. at 977.
343. See, e.g., W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941).

344. U.S.

CONST.

art. VI, § 2.

345. E.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
346. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay), at 422 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
347. E.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
348. See, e.g., Dickson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political
Questions," 104 U. PA. L. Rnv. 451, 484-92 (1956).
349. See, e.g., Williams, The Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (1976).
350. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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often the oppressor of his people, has personally too much stake in
the government to be in any material danger of being corrupted by
foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or
slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very remote
when he may probably be obliged to return to the station from
which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would require superlative
virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray
the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. An ambitious
man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign
power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The history of
human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human
virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of
so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the
United States.3 51
Equally important, the structure of international law suggests
that the agreements be more closely scrutinized. Mutual respect
is the cornerstone of international law. But, given the lack of
sanctions in international law3 52 and the difficulties of settling
third party disputes through concerted action emanating from the
United Nations, national courts may provide the only effective forum for enforcement of minimal standards of world public order.
James M. Redwine
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